forgejo/modules/keying/keying.go
oliverpool 67df538958 feat: cache derived keys for faster keying (#10114)
Currently `DeriveKey` is called every time that a secret must be encoded/decoded. Since this function is deterministic, its result can be cached to allow a 250x speedup (the original took less than half a microsecond, so this more of a micro-optimization...).

```
go test -bench=.
goos: linux
goarch: amd64
pkg: forgejo.org/modules/keying
cpu: Intel(R) Core(TM) Ultra 5 125H
BenchmarkExpandPRK-18            2071627               564.2 ns/op
BenchmarkExpandPRKOnce-18       541438192                2.206 ns/op
PASS
ok      forgejo.org/modules/keying      2.369s
```

## Other changes

- Since the keys can be constructed once, it simplifies a bit the callsites (`keying.TOTP.Encrypt(...)` instead of `keying.DeriveKey(keying.ContextTOTP).Encrypt(...)`)
- All `Encrypt`/`Decrypt` calls will panic forever if called before `Init` has been called (current it panics as long as `Init` has not been called)
- Calling `Init` twice with different keys will trigger a panic (currently racy)
- Calling `Decrypt` with a short ciphertext does not panic anymore (like when calling with long-enough garbage)

Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/10114
Reviewed-by: Gusted <gusted@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: oliverpool <git@olivier.pfad.fr>
Co-committed-by: oliverpool <git@olivier.pfad.fr>
2025-11-16 14:29:14 +01:00

156 lines
5.7 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2024 The Forgejo Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// Keying is a module that allows for subkeys to be deterministically generated
// from the same master key. It allows for domain separation to take place by
// using new keys for new subsystems/domains. These subkeys are provided with
// an API to encrypt and decrypt data. The module panics if a bad interaction
// happened, the panic should be seen as an non-recoverable error.
//
// HKDF (per RFC 5869) is used to derive new subkeys in a safe manner. It
// provides a KDF security property, which is required for Forgejo, as the
// secret key would be an ASCII string and isn't a random uniform bit string.
// XChaCha-Poly1305 (per draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01) is used as AEAD to encrypt
// and decrypt messages. A new fresh random nonce is generated for every
// encryption. The nonce gets prepended to the ciphertext.
package keying
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/hkdf"
crand "crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
)
// Specifies the context for which a subkey should be derived for.
var (
// Used for the `push_mirror` table.
PushMirror = deriveKey("pushmirror")
// Used for the `two_factor` table.
TOTP = deriveKey("totp")
// Used for the `secret` table.
ActionSecret = deriveKey("action_secret")
// Used for the `task` table where type == TaskTypeMigrateRepo.
MigrateTask = deriveKey("migrate_repo_task")
)
var (
// The hash used for HKDF.
hash = sha256.New
// The AEAD used for encryption/decryption.
aead = chacha20poly1305.NewX
// The pseudorandom key generated by HKDF-Extract.
prk atomic.Value
)
// Set the main IKM for this module.
func Init(ikm []byte) {
// Salt is intentionally left empty, it's not useful to Forgejo's use case.
buf, err := hkdf.Extract(hash, ikm, nil)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
if ok := prk.CompareAndSwap(nil, buf); ok {
return
}
// prk was already set
old := prk.Load().([]byte)
if bytes.Equal(old, buf) {
return
}
panic("main IKM cannot be updated at runtime")
}
const (
aeadKeySize = chacha20poly1305.KeySize
aeadNonceSize = chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX
)
// Derive *the* key for a given context, this is a deterministic function.
// The same key will be provided for the same context.
func deriveKey(context string) Context {
// wrap another sync.Once to prevent panic on initialization (prk would be nil)
return Context{sync.OnceValue(func() cipher.AEAD {
return expandPRK(prk.Load().([]byte), context)
})}
}
func expandPRK(prk []byte, context string) cipher.AEAD {
if len(prk) != sha256.Size {
panic("keying: not initialized")
}
key, err := hkdf.Expand(hash, prk, context, aeadKeySize)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
e, err := aead(key)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return e
}
type Context struct {
aead func() cipher.AEAD
}
// Encrypts the specified plaintext with some additional data that is tied to
// this plaintext. The additional data can be seen as the context in which the
// data is being encrypted for, this is different than the context for which the
// key was derived; this allows for more granularity without deriving new keys.
// Avoid any user-generated data to be passed into the additional data. The most
// common usage of this would be to encrypt a database field, in that case use
// the ID and database column name as additional data. The additional data isn't
// appended to the ciphertext and may be publicly known, it must be available
// when decryping the ciphertext.
func (k Context) Encrypt(plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
nonce := make([]byte, aeadNonceSize)
_, _ = crand.Read(nonce) // never returns an error
// Returns the ciphertext of this plaintext.
return k.aead().Seal(nonce, nonce, plaintext, additionalData)
}
// Decrypts the ciphertext and authenticates it against the given additional
// data that was given when it was encrypted. It returns an error if the
// authentication failed.
func (k Context) Decrypt(ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if len(ciphertext) <= aeadNonceSize {
return nil, errors.New("keying: ciphertext is too short")
}
nonce, ciphertext := ciphertext[:aeadNonceSize], ciphertext[aeadNonceSize:]
return k.aead().Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData)
}
// ColumnAndID generates a context that can be used as additional context for
// encrypting and decrypting data. It requires the column name and the row ID
// (this requires to be known beforehand). Be careful when using this, as the
// table name isn't part of this context. This means it's not bound to a
// particular table. The table should be part of the context that the key was
// derived for, in which case it binds through that.
func ColumnAndID(column string, id int64) []byte {
return binary.BigEndian.AppendUint64(append([]byte(column), ':'), uint64(id))
}
// ColumnAndJSONSelectorAndID generates a context that can be used as additional context
// for encrypting and decrypting data. It requires the column name, JSON
// selector and the row ID (this requires to be known beforehand). Be careful
// when using this, as the table name isn't part of this context. This means
// it's not bound to a particular table. The table should be part of the context
// that the key was derived for, in which case it binds through that. Use this
// over `ColumnAndID` if you're encrypting data that's stored inside JSON.
// jsonSelector must be a unambigous selector to the JSON field that stores the
// encrypted data.
func ColumnAndJSONSelectorAndID(column, jsonSelector string, id int64) []byte {
return binary.BigEndian.AppendUint64(append(append([]byte(column), ':'), append([]byte(jsonSelector), ':')...), uint64(id))
}